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Abstract 
The  referendum  held  on  September  12,  2010  included  fundamental  changes  in 
Turkish constitution related with the social, judicial and economic aspects. We are 
of the opinion that the referendum offered a general view on the reflections of 
government  policies,  since  the  incumbent  party,  Justice  and  Development  Party 
(AKP), officially supported the proposed changes and the main opposition parties, 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP), were opposed. 
We  tested  the  effects  of  political  tendencies  on  the  referendum  results  using 
provincial data. The results show that the “yes” votes are higher in the provinces 
where AKP has a stronger base, and lower in the provinces where the opposition 
parties, especially  CHP, have stronger bases. Moreover,  our analyses imply that 
referendum  votes  are  higher  where  economic  conditions  are  getting  relatively 
better  in  the  last  year.  However,  we  could  not  find  a  positive  effect  of  public 
spending on the patterns of voting. 
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1. Introduction 
A  Plebiscite,  more  commonly  known  as  a  referendum,  is  a  means  of  making 
decisions  within  the  boundaries  of  representational  democracy,  though  the 
frequency of consulting this varies in each country. According to Türköne (2003) 
and (Dursun, 1990), referendum, as one of the prominent features of a plebiscitary 
democracy, is the right of the people to introduce their choice directly in a specific 
issue and to have a determining feature. It can be considered as a form of direct or 
participatory democracy. Andrew Heywood (1999) defined the reasons and areas 
for  the  application  of  a  referendum:  A  plebiscite  or  referendum  provides  an 
opportunity for the electorate to make a decision directly on a specific issue, and it 
is out of the representational democracy, since it is a different application from 
empowering  politicians  and  allowing  them  to  make  decisions  on  behalf  of  the 
electorate.  While  a  referendum  can  be  held  on  every  level  of  every  issue  in 
Switzerland, it can only be held for constitutional regulations in Ireland, and can be 
held for exclusive and important decisions like EU membership in England and in 
many other countries. 
The referendum held in Turkey on 12 September, 2010 was for the purpose of 
inviting the opinion of the public on a subject which was not compromised in the 
Parliament.  Regardless  of  the  concreteness  of  the  subject,  referendums  in 
countries  like  Turkey  frequently  set  the  scene  for  a  showdown  between  the 
government  and  the  opposition.  It  gives  necessary  space  for  the  discussion  of 
fundamental problems, and provides the opposition with grounds to criticize all 
government activities. 
There  are  some  theories,  such  as  the  directional  theory  of  electoral  choice, 
proximity model (Westholm, 1997) or the spatial theory (Blazer and Dreier, 1999) 
which analyze choices in elections. The theories and models used in analyzing the 
elections’ or referendums’ results are important to obtain effective evaluation. The 
results of the September 12 referendum were expected to be affected significantly 
by  economic  conditions,  regardless  of  socio-political  situations.  Thus,  whether 
economic factors have influenced the referendum results and whether they had a 
positive or negative effect will be studied in this article. We are of the opinion that 
the referendum offered a general review of government policies and the return of 
government investments to the public with their many consequences. Although 
considering the referendum result as data for the general elections is not quite 
accurate, still it is important enough to be considered. 
The referendum on September 12 included constitutional changes with the claim of 
reforming  the  judiciary  extensively  and  constructing  a  more  democratic  judicial 
system. Moreover, it promised to bring appropriate regulations for EU standards 
while  extending  and  developing  fundamental  human  rights  and  freedoms.  The 
following are the amended or reconstituted constitution articles included in the 
constitutional reform package: the article on equality before the law (article 10), The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on the 2010 Turkish Referendum 
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the privacy of special life (article 20), freedoms of travel and settlement (article 23), 
the right to establish a trade union (article 51), collective bargaining, right to strike 
and lockout (articles 53 and 54), and restructuring the Supreme Council of Judges 
and Prosecutors and increasing the number of its members (article 159). Similarly 
twenty- six articles of the Constitution were changed. 
The  referendum  presented  a  different  picture,  since  people  with  very  different 
political ideologies compromised in the same direction. Thus, it can be deduced 
that political tendencies are not the only agent in determining the direction of a 
referendum. Moreover, it is claimed that the opposition did not support the reform 
package due to some disagreements commonly known; they did not oppose many 
of the amendments. 
The voter turnout in the referendum was 73.71 %, which is a high percentage for a 
Western  democracy.  Generally,  the  percentage  of  people  voting  “Yes”  for 
constitutional reform for democratization is 57.88 %; while it is 42.12 % for “no” 
(ysk.gov.tr,  2011).  Hence,  constitutional  changes  are  agreed  upon  and  applied. 
Naturally, many deductions beyond the main reason of holding the referendum can 
be inferred on the basis of the referendum result. Even issues that are not included 
in the reform package are somehow related and used for political campaigns. It is 
partly  because  it  is  accepted  as  a  vote  of  confidence  for  the  approval  of  the 
government  policies  by  both  the  government  and  the  opposition.  Although 
government parties are not usually content with such an early vote of confidence, 
it is understood that Justice and Development Party (AKP) used this referendum as 
an opportunity to seek approval by the public for its policies. It is clearly indicated 
by the fact that both the government party and the opposition held nation-wide 
meetings, etc. It was openly demonstrated that almost all the party organizations 
as well as the electorate conceived this as if it was a general election result. 
2. Economic Policies and their Effects on the Referendum Results 
We will focus on economic factors of the referendum results as well as considering 
some of the other factors. It is known that social and economic changes of the kind 
are  thought  to  sustain  the  development  of  instrumental  political  competence 
(Krause and Marcus, 1984). We might posit that this would affect levels of electoral 
misconduct  in  the  general  level  of  economic  development  in  a  country  (Birch, 
2007). It is appropriate to begin by stating that there are many arguments that can 
answer  the  excess  of  the  “Yes”  votes  in  the  referendum.  While  some  of  the 
arguments constitute the subject of this article, some other important part of the 
arguments, even if worthy of analyzing, appear to be thematically inappropriate for 
this article. We choose to restrict the subject of this study to the explanation of the 
correlation between the electorate behavior and rational economic behavior within 
the context of referendum results. Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadir CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN 
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The  nation-wide  “Yes”  decision  as  being  that  the  general  electorate  probably 
considers the policies and performance of AKP, who was in favor of the “yes” votes, 
are successful.  The prevalent positive effects of the government policies  create 
support for the choices and decisions of the government in favor of its citizens. 
Similar  to  general  elections,  referendum  is  considered  as  a  political  activity  to 
display that support by the electorate. Thus, a referendum becomes a mechanism 
to test the policies of a government that promotes a policy of growing its economy 
(Carlsen, 1999). 
The referendum results will have a long-lasting influence on the Turkish economy 
which is closely related to the interpretation, comprehension and execution of the 
policies of the government and the opposition, and are significantly tied to these. It 
can  be  determined  that  certain  data  regarding  the  economic  policies  of  the 
government and to what extent national and local investments contribute, can be 
deduced  through  the  referendum  result.  We  will  attempt  to  examine  whether 
short term (populist) investments made before the 12 September 2010 referendum 
affected the referendum result substantially. In the absence of strong political and 
ideological consciousness and especially in the absence of interactions, voters tend 
to respond to the myriad of short-term forces that abound in election campaigns 
(Zuckerman, Valentino, and Zuckerman, 1994). Is there a direct proportion when 
the current referendum result details are compared to the percentage of  state 
investments per person in a specific constituency? Our inquiry indicates that there 
is not a direct proportion. In other words, the electorate not only makes a choice 
according  to  the  abundance  of  state  facilities  that  s/he  benefits  from,  but  the 
electorate  makes  choices  under  the  influence  of  other  factors,  as  well.  As 
commonly accepted, it was predicted to see a higher percentage of “yes” votes 
indicated  more  support  for  the  government  party  in  economically  fast  growing 
cities.  However  a  deep  analysis  of  the  referendum  results  presents  a  different 
picture.  
3. Data and Methodology 
We propose several hypotheses about the political and economical explanations of 
the referendum results and statistically test them. In the referendum, incumbent 
party,  AKP,  officially  supported  the  proposed  changes  and  the  main  opposition 
parties,  Republican  People’s  Party  (CHP)  and  Nationalist  Action  Party  (MHP), 
opposed to those changes. We hypothesize that in the provinces where AKP has a 
strong base, the “Yes” votes would be relatively more than “No” votes. Similarly we 
hypothesize that in the provinces where CHP and MHP have a strong base, “no” 
votes would be relatively more than “Yes” votes. In order to test these hypotheses, 
we obtained the statistics of the votes cast in favor of AKP, CHP and MHP in the 
2009 local elections at the provincial level. It can be argued that since 2009 local 
elections might not represent the true tendencies of voters in provinces because 
many other factors were effective on the 2009 local election results, including the The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on the 2010 Turkish Referendum 
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personalities of local candidates. However, many commentators claimed that 2009 
elections  were  rather  like  general  elections  than  local  elections,  it  was  kind  of 
referendum for the approval of AKP’s policies on many issues. We therefore believe 
that using parties’ vote shares in the 2009 elections is  a valid way to measure 
political tendencies in each province
1. However, we used the vote shares of parties 
in the provincial assembly (İl Genel Meclisi) rather than the votes for mayor. We 
consider that provincial assembly votes are representing party preferences more 
than inclination towards particular mayor candidates.  
Next  we  turn  to  economic  explanations  of  referendum  voting  patterns
2.  Our 
hypothesis  is  that  those  individuals  who  are  happy  about  the  economic 
performance of the government would vote “Yes” in referendum. So we argue that 
individuals  who  are  living  in  neighborhoods  where  the  economy  is  growing 
relatively faster, and where inflation and unemployment rates are relatively lower, 
would be satisfied by the economic performance of the incumbent AKP, and would 
vote “yes” in the referendum. In order to measure the economic success of the 
incumbent party, we need data about the income growth rate, inflation rate and 
unemployment rate at the provincial level. Unfortunately, none of those indicators 
are available at the provincial level for recent years. However, tax revenues can be 
used as proxies for income levels. Normally tax revenues are not ideal proxies for 
income  levels  especially  in  countries  like  Turkey  in  which  tax  evasion  rates  are 
substantial. However, we are interested in changes in the income levels of each 
province rather than levels. Assuming there is not a substantial variation in the 
changes in the tax evasion rates between provinces in the relevant period; we do 
expect that changes in tax revenues to be a good proxy for the changes in the 
income levels of provinces. An examination of the data from the periods (1990-
2001) in which both income levels and tax revenues are available supports this 
conjecture. The correlation coefficient between provincial income growth rates and 
provincial tax revenue growth rates is greater than 95%.Therefore; we have used 
monthly cumulative general budget tax revenues obtained from the website of the 
General Directorate of Public Accounts
3.  
Social transfer programs and other government expenditures can also affect the 
satisfaction  of  the  voters’  from  the  incumbent  party  policies.  During  the 
referendum  campaign,  it  has  been  argued  that  government  institutions  were 
spending extraordinary amount of resources in order to sway constituents’ votes. 
Many concrete examples of social transfer programs were discussed in the mass 
                                                           
1 See Köksal, Civan and Genç (2010) for more discussion on that. 
2 See the Lewis and Steigmaier (2000) for a review of influence of economic conditions on voters. Also 
see Akarca and Tansel (2006,2007), Baslevent et al (2005), Baslevent et al (2009), Carkoglu (1997,2008) 
and Köksal, Civan and Genç (2010) for the applications of these theories on Turkish Elections.   
3 See Köksal, Civan and Genç (2010) for more on the use of tax revenues as proxy for incomes. Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadir CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN 
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media.
4  Consequently,  we  collected  the  government  spending  data  at  the 
provincial  level.  In  the  same  way  that  we  obtained  the  tax  revenue  data,  the 
government  spending  data  was  obtained  from  the  website  of  the  General 
Directorate of Public Accounts.  
Based on those hypotheses, we estimated the following regression: 
i i
i i i i i
g PubSpendin
Growth MHP CHP AKP YES
e b
b b b b b
+ +
+ + + + =
5
4 3 2 1 0 2009 2009 2009  
Where: 
YESi : The ratio of yes votes to total votes in province i.  
AKP2009i : The vote share of AKP in the 2009 election in province i. 
CHP2009i : The vote share of CHP in the 2009 election in province i. 
MHP2009i : The vote share of MHP in the2009 election in province i. 
Growthi  :  The  increase  in  the  average  income  level  of  residents  of  province  i 
between the 2009 election and the referendum.  
Pubspendingi  :  The  increase  in  public  spending  in  province  i  between  the  2009 
election and the referendum.  
Below  are  the  expected  signs  of  the  coefficients  of  the  variables  used  in  the 
regressions. 
Variable 
Expected sign of the 
coefficient 
Correlation Coefficient between 
Referendum “yes” votes 
AKP2009  +  0,36 
CHP2009  -  -0,84 
MHP2009  -  -0,35 
Growth  +  0,12 
Pubspending  +  0,10 
The correlation coefficient between the relevant variable and the ratio of “Yes” 
votes on the referendum is provided in the third column. All of these coefficients 
have the expected signs. We also conducted multivariable regression techniques to 
test our hypothesis more robustly. In the regression analysis  standard Ordinary 
Least  Squares  (OLS)  technique  is  used.  Standard  errors  are  adjusted  for 
heterocedasticity. 
It can be argued that referendum votes are left censored since the “Yes” votes 
cannot be negative; so instead of OLS techniques, Tobit should be used. However 
minimum ratio of “yes” votes is in Tunceli (19%). So left censoring does not pose a 
problem. In any case Tobit estimates give very similar results.  
                                                           
4 For example, in many provinces government officials distributed coal, food and durable household 
items to the needy. Many claimed these were part of political campaign while government officials 
defended those as part of regular social transfer programs. The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on the 2010 Turkish Referendum 
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4. Results and Discussion 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis of our study are 
reported in Table 1. In the referendum, the percentage of “Yes” votes was 57.8, 
however  the  results  of  the  descriptive  statistics  present  that  the  mean  of  the 
provinces’  “Yes”  votes  is  about  64  percent.  The  underlying  reason  for  this 
difference is the demographic structure of the provinces. If we use a population 
weight in the calculation of mean, we can reach 57.8%, the overall “Yes” votes in 
the referendum. Mainly this statistics shows that, the mean of the “Yes” votes of 
the provinces, with a lower population, are higher than that of the provinces with a 
higher population. This also shows that the distribution of votes of in the larger 
provinces is more homogenous than in smaller provinces.  
Another statistic we can interpret from the below table is that, while the AKP share 
of the votes in the provincial assembly in the 2009 local elections changed from 
20% to 55%, there are some provinces where the opposition parties almost have 
no vote for provincial assembly. For example, the main opposition party, CHP, was 
unable to have any of its members elected in the provincial assembly in Hakkari.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Yes  81  64.41  18.70  18.98  95.75 
AKP2009  81  38.29  8.23  19.7  54.7 
CHP2009  81  16.48  10.90  0  48.3 
MHP2009  81  16.71  9.26  0.5  42.5 
Growth  81  0.13  0.13  -0.48  0.50 
PubSpending  81  0.20  0.06  0.10  0.37 
Empirical  results  of  the  study  are  reported  in  Table  2  in  detail.  The  following 
equations represent the estimated regressions of our study. As these estimations 
present the purpose of the empirical analysis, we chose to analyze the portion of 
the variation in the “Yes” votes of referendum across the provinces that can be 
attributed to variations in provincial political and economic changes. In order to 
examine the political and economic effects of the provinces on the “Yes” votes at 
the  referendum  separately,  the  following  three  regressions  were  estimated. 
Equation  1  represents  the  political  effect  only  while  the  other  two  equations 
include the economic effects of the provinces as well as political effects. 
i i i i i MHP CHP AKP YES e + + + + = 2009 69 . 0 2009 24 . 1 2009 67 . 0 80 . 70             (1) 
i i
i i i i
g PubSpendin
MHP CHP AKP YES
e + +
+ + + =
48 . 11
2009 69 . 0 2009 25 . 1 2009 66 . 0 48 . 73     (2) 
i i i
i i i i
Growth g PubSpendin
MHP CHP AKP YES
e + + +
+ + + =
30 . 7 21 . 13
2009 67 . 0 2009 26 . 1 2009 64 . 0 53 . 73     (3) Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadir CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN 
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The results for equation 1 indicate that political explanatory variables (vote shares 
of the political parties in the 2009 local elections) affect the “Yes” votes in the 
referendum  significantly.  The  results  further  show  that  there  is  a  positive 
relationship between the vote shares of AKP in local election at provincial level and 
the “Yes” votes in the referendum and it is significant at 1% level of significance. 
Likewise, the opposition parties’ vote shares have a negative effect on the “Yes” 
votes as expected, and both coefficients are significant at 1% level of significance. 
According to the estimation results, elasticities of coefficients which are reported in 
the marginal effects column indicate that the percentage change that will occur in 
one variable (y) when another variable changes one percent. That is, a one percent 
change in AKP vote shares increases the “Yes” votes 0.40 percent. On the other 
hand, a one percent increase in the CHP and MHP vote shares decreases the “Yes” 
votes 0.32 and 0.18 percent respectively.  
The empirical results also imply that, according to the estimated coefficients of the 
opposition parties, as the estimated coefficient of the main opposition party, CHP, 
is greater than MHP, the proportion of “Yes” votes is lower than in the provinces 
where CHP has a strong voter base than in the provinces where MHP has a strong 
voter base. This also indicates that the proportion of MHP supporters who voted 
“Yes” is greater than CHP supporters. 
As  indicated  in  the  data  and  methodology  above,  we  took  the  increase  in  the 
provinces’ public spending and the average income level of residents to explain the 
economical effects on the “Yes” votes in the referendum. The estimation results 
report that there is a negative relationship between public spending and the “Yes” 
votes in the referendum. While the coefficient is not significant, the expected sign 
is also incorrect. This result implies that incumbent party policies such as social 
transfer  programs  and  other  government  expenditures  do  not  affect  the 
satisfaction of the voters. Also another explanation can be made according to this 
result.  This  is  that  the  incumbent  party’s  social  transfer  programs  and  other 
government expenditures are realized in the provinces, where the ruling party’s 
vote  performance  is  average.  The  extraordinary  spending  was  not  made  in  the 
provinces  where  AKP  and  the  opposition  parties  have  a  voting  base.  Thus,  we 
cannot  explain  a  significant  effect  of  PubSpending  on  the  “Yes”  votes  in 
referendum.
5  The  other  estimated  coefficients  are  significant  at  1%  level  of 
significance and affect the “Yes” votes as expected. The detailed results can be 
seen in Table 2 from the equation 2 estimation results.  
According to equation 3, while the PubSpending variable is insignificant for all the 
significance levels, we included the Growth variable for the regression to explain 
the economic effects on the “Yes” votes in the referendum. As mentioned above, 
growth implies the economic performance of the incumbent party (AKP) at the 
                                                           
5 AKP’s maximum vote share was 54.7% at Konya and minimum at Tunceli with 19.7% in the 2009 local 
elections.  Public  spending  growth  between  the  2009  local  election  and  the  referendum  for  both 
provinces were below the average provincial public spending growth.  The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on the 2010 Turkish Referendum 
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provincial  level,  and  thus  it  is  expected  that  it  increased  the  votes  for  the 
incumbent party.  The estimated coefficient of the provinces’ economic growth is 
significantly  positive,  indicating  a  percent  increase  in  the  economic  growth  of 
provinces increasing the “Yes” votes 0.01 percent. This result also implies that the 
economic success of the incumbent party (AKP) at the provincial level has positive 
significant effect on the “Yes” votes. The estimated coefficient signs suggest that 
the incumbent party (“Yes” votes) would benefit from higher economic growth, 
whereas the opposition parties would be influenced negatively.
6 
Table 2: Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: “Yes” votes                                    Method: Ordinary Least Squares 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3 
Variables  Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
c 
70.80 
(8.80)
* 
  73.48 
(11.74)
* 
  73.54 
(11.56)
* 
 
AKP2009 
0.67 
(4.23)
* 
0.40  0.66 
(4.55)
* 
0.39  0.64 
(4.29)
* 
0.38 
CHP2009 
-1.24 
(-15.52)
* 
-0.32  -1.25 
(-14.49)
* 
-0.32  -1.26 
(-14.59)
* 
-0.32 
MHP2009 
-0.69 
(-7.82)
* 
-0.18  -0.69 
(-7.40)
* 
-0.18  -0.67 
(-7.27)
* 
-0.17 
PubSpending 
    -11.48 
(-0.44) 
-0.03  -13.21 
(-0.51) 
-0.04 
Growth 
        7.31 
(1.71)
** 
0.01 
R-squared  0.83  0.84  0.84 
F-statistics  223.82  174.03  161.32 
Prob(F-statistics)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Number of Obs.  81  81  81 
Note: Values in parenthesis are t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
We  would  like  to  also  emphasize  that  the  coefficients  of  the  equations  and 
marginal effects of the coefficients do not alter when adding a new variable to the 
regression. This result improves the reliability of estimation results in our empirical 
analysis.  
The R
2 value of the model indicates that the explanatory variables we use in our 
analysis  are  able  to  explain  84%  of  the  variation  in  the  “Yes”  votes  of  the 
referendum. Almost 16% of the variation in the “Yes” votes cannot be explained by 
the parties’ vote shares in local elections and economical changes at the provincial 
                                                           
6 Bingöl was one of the fastest growing province between the 2009 local elections and the referendum, 
therefore  the  “Yes”  votes  were  about  95%  in  the  referendum  2010.  On  the  contrary,  Hatay  had 
relatively less growth rate than the other provinces, the “No” votes were higher than the “Yes” votes in 
Hatay. Harun YÜKSEL, Abdulkadir CIVAN & Ertuğrul GÜNDOĞAN 
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level.  There  must  be  other  differences  between  the  2009  elections  and  the 
referendum which influenced the “Yes” votes. As the R
2 values indicate, although 
the explanatory variables are able to explain 83%, 84% and 84% of the variation in 
the “Yes” votes for the three equations respectively, the economic explanations 
seem to have no remarkable effect on the “Yes” votes. In the main, this can be 
explained the profile of the country’s voters. In our country, political partisanship 
has come into prominence in the present than rational economic behavior. In some 
provinces  of  our  country,  voters’  behaviors  do  not  change  to  corroborate  the 
incumbent party’s success.  
5. Conclusion 
The  September  12,  2010  referendum  made  substantial  changes  to  the  Turkish 
Constitution. The incumbent party, AKP, supported the proposed changes while the 
opposition parties opposed them. At the end of the referendum, 26 articles of the 
Constitution were amended. Relatively significant changes were made in the fields 
of the composition of higher courts including the Constitutional Court, fundamental 
human rights and labor market conditions. In this study we have proposed several 
hypotheses regarding the political and economic explanations of the referendum 
results and test them statistically.  
Our opinion is that even though the referendum was about on specific issues and 
most of the proposed changes were supported by a wide variety of political and 
social groups, the result is a reflection of government policies. We hypothesize that 
the  individuals  who  are  happy  about  the  government  polices  voted  yes  in  the 
referendum.  First  we  examined  at  the  political  explanation  for  the  results.  We 
analyzed the relationship between the referendum results and the votes received 
by the main parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) in the previous election (2009). We found 
that in the provinces where AKP had relatively higher votes, the referendum yes 
votes were also higher. On the other hand, in the provinces where CHP and MHP 
had relatively higher votes, in the referendum no votes were higher. However this 
effect  was  more  pronounced  for  CHP.  That  might  imply  that  CHP  was  more 
successful than MHP on convincing its party sympathizers to follow its official policy 
on the referendum.  
We also studied the effects of economic variables on the referendum results. By 
using provincial level data, we tested whether the economic conditions had any 
influence over voting patterns. Indeed, the data supports the assertion that in the 
provinces where economic conditions were relatively improved more in the last 
year,  the  referendum  votes  were  higher.  Finally,  we  analyzed  the  impact  of 
government spending on the referendum results. It has been argued that populist 
spending and transfers by the government institutions were aiming to increase the 
support  for  the  proposed  changes.  However,  we  could  not  find  any  effect  of 
government spending on voting patterns. The Impact of Economic and Political Factors on the 2010 Turkish Referendum 
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